Abstract-Short Message Service (SMS) is a widely used communication medium for mobile applications, such as banking, social networking, and e-commerce. Applications of SMS services also include real-time broadcasting messages, such as notification of natural disasters (e.g., bushfires and hurricane) and terrorist attacks, and sharing the current whereabouts to other users, such as notifying urgent business meeting information, transmitting quick information in the battlefield to multiple users, notifying current location to our friends and sharing market information. However, traditional SMS is not designed with security in mind (e.g., messages are not securely sent). It is also possible to extract international mobile subscriber identity of the mobile user. In the literature, there is no known protocol that could enable secure transmission of SMS from one user to multiple users simultaneously. In this paper, we introduce a batch verification authentication and key agreement protocol, BVPSMS, which provides end-to-end message security over an insecure communication channel between different mobile subscribers. Specifically, the proposed protocol securely transmits SMS from one mobile user to multiple users simultaneously. The reliability of the protocol is discussed along with an algorithm to detect malicious user request in a batch. We then evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol in terms of communication and computation overheads, protocol execution time, and batch and re-batch verification times. The impacts of the user mobility, and the time, space and cost complexity analysis are also discussed. We then present a formal security proof of the proposed protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first provably-secure batch verification protocol that delivers end-to-end SMS security using symmetric keys.
INTRODUCTION
C ELLULAR and mobile telecommunication industries are one of the fastest growing industries globally, partly due to the capability to provide a wide range of services to the Mobile Subscribers (MSs), such as health surveillance [1] , health financing and health worker performance [2] , Short Message Service (SMS)-based web search [3] and endto-end communications [4] , [5] . However, the challenge for the server to handle multiple authentication requests at one time or in a very short time period (e.g., during the first few minutes of a major incident, such as a natural disaster or terrorist attack) is an area that has attracted the attention of researchers in recent years.
Research Problem
When an SMS is sent from one MS to another, the information contained in the SMS is transmitted as plaintext [6] . SMS may also contain confidential information such as PIN number and a link to a login page. Transmission of such confidential information as plaintext over an insecure network can be targeted by an adversary (e.g., intercepting, reading and modifying the SMS before it reaches the SMSCenter (SMSC) [7] , [8] . Traditional SMS service does not have a mechanism to transmit the message securely from one MS to another MS or to a group of MSs. The EasySMS [9] and SmartSMS [10] are the only available protocols in the literature that enable secure transmission of SMS from one MS to another [9] . However, no such protocol exists in the literature that can securely delivers an SMS to multiple recipients simultaneously. This is surprising, as in our increasingly interconnected society, there are a number of situations where secure transmission of batch SMS can play a crucial role, such as sending urgent business meeting information to two or more employees or to the members of the political parties, military services like simultaneous and quick transmission of secure information in the battlefield, notifying current location to our friends or family members when a person is in trouble, sharing market information, crowd-sourcing information, human flesh search engine of notifying other users about a corrupted public servant by secure SMS, and in some cases life-saving (e.g., notifying residents in remote areas of a fast spreading bushfire, an earthquake or a volcano eruption, or notifying all residents and users in the vicinity of an area to stay indoor due to an ongoing terrorist attack). In many of these applications, we should not compromise on security for the capability for batch dissemination of SMS. For example, without an endto-end (batch) SMS security mechanism in place, a malicious attacker could hijack and replace a batch SMS from the local authorities with one that will create social unrest (e.g., messages inciting racial hatred). In addition, the protocol should be sufficiently lightweight, suitable for deployment on resource-constrained devices (e.g., limited battery) [11] . We will address such security issues and consider them in the system and threat models.
Existing Solutions
Several batch verification-based solutions have been designed for different applications. For example, a number of protocols have been proposed for the value added services in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET) [12] , [13] , [14] , public-private key-based vehicular communication system [15] , [16] , [17] , and digital signatures in batch to achieve high efficiency [18] , [19] . Several SMS-based wireless protocols [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , lightweight AKA [7] and SMS-based attacks and their countermeasures are discussed in [8] . Also, the protocols in [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] are designed to provide SMS security based on asymmetric key cryptography with the exception in [26] . Other protocols in the literature include [28] , [29] designed for the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [35] for the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), and [36] , [37] for the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks. However, all these protocols do not consider simultaneous multiple authentication requests using SMS. Group Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols are also available in the LTE network [38] , [39] . However, these protocols do not consider SMS as a communication medium and require additional cost and storage for a group setup. Recently, a solution for user privacy in mobile telephony was proposed using the predefined multiple International Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSI) for each Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) [40] . However, this solution requires a large storage space, generates a huge overhead for pseudo-identities, and utilizes significant bandwidth for sending IMSIs to each MS.
The SSMS protocol [41] and the Secure Extensible and Efficient SMS (SEESMS) protocol [42] , [43] do not provide end-to-end SMS security for mobile users, rather they provide security between a mobile user and the server, which is just a subpart of the problem of this paper and also was the same in EasySMS. These protocols in addition to the protocol in [44] do not focus the communication and computation overheads, prevention from attacks, and the bandwidth utilization. The additional drawback with SEESMS is that it was not suitable for resource constraint devices like mobile phones. There are other existing protocols as well for securing SMS between a mobile user and the server: SecureSMS [45] , SK-SIM [46] , and SMSSec [47] , however, they do not provide SMS security between the end users. Similarly, the VAS-AKA [48] protocol does not provide end-to-end SMS security for mobile users, rather it secures the communication between a mobile user and the serviceprovision server in order to deliver value added services.
There are mainly two approaches of designing authentication system, namely peer-to-peer approach and serverbased approach. The peer-to-peer security approach recommended in [49] is based on the public key crytosystem, which requires a public-private key pair for each user. It does not require a central authority or a central server for authentication, but the overall processing is relatively slow in comparison to a symmetric key cryptosystem. On the other hand, [50] and [51] mentioned that the Authentication Server (AS) is a better strategy, as it provides faster processing and supports lightweight authentication for a large number of users. However, a single point of failure can be an issue if there is only one AS deployed in the system. In this paper, we selected the server-based approach for authenticating user requests as it supports the existing cellular infrastructure, where an AS is a part of the Authentication Center (AuC).
A literature review suggests that there is no known batch verification-based protocol that provides end-to-end SMS security to many MS, although we observe that commercially available applications, such as SMSzipper, TextSecure, moGile Secure SMS, and CryptoSMS provide the facility to send secure SMS. However, there are a number of limitations in these software solutions, such as (i) the need to install them on the phone's memory/memory card, (ii) the need to provide a secret key to the SMS recipient, and (iii) the inability to support sending of an SMS to many users simultaneously. Moreover, the security of the communications may also be affected by malware installed or vulnerabilities on the client devices. Therefore, a preferred solution is to develop a protocol that provides end-to-end security.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient batch verification-based AKA protocol, hereafter referred to as Batch Verification Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol (BVPSMS), which enables the transmission of an SMS to multiple recipients at any one time. The BVPSMS uses symmetric keys, since symmetric key encryptions are significantly faster than asymmetric key encryptions and as shown in [52] , [53] , they consume less energy. The proposed protocol has the following contributions:
1) The BVPSMS protocol: a) provides mutual authentication between the sender MS and the Authentication Server (AS), and between each recipient MS i and the AS. b) maintains message confidentiality and integrity using AES with Counter (AES-CTR) and Message Authentication Code (MAC), respectively, during messages transmission over an insecure network. c) allows the sending of only one of n-pieces of the secret code of the key by sender MS to each recipient MS. It has the following advantages: (i) sending a partial code to each recipient MS improves the overall security of the system, and (ii) reduces the total communication overhead generated by the protocol.
2) Our protocol is secure against replay attack, Manin-the-Middle (MITM) attack, impersonation attack, SMS disclosure, and SMS spoofing. 3) Each user's original identity is kept secret during the authentication over the network. It protects the user against IMSI tracing and ID-theft attacks.
We compare our protocol with four other related protocols (ABAKA, RAISE, SPECS, and b-SPECS+). In a batch authentication when number of requests are 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, and the findings are as follows: 1) During first time (fresh) authentication, i.e., BVPSMS * , reduces 6.1%, 23%, 12.5%, and 46.52% of the communication overhead as compared to ABAKA, RAISE, SPECS, and b-SPECS+, respectively, and is equal of the BLS protocol. However, BLS does not provide mutual authentication, user privacy, integrity protection, and offers only partial resilience to impersonation attack. 2) During each subsequent authentication, i.e., BVPSMS * * , lowers the communication bandwidth by 79.27%, 89.83%, 80.69%, and 88.2% in comparison to ABAKA, RAISE, SPECS, and b-SPECS+, respectively.
In addition, findings from the simulations (i.e. execution time, verification time, and re-batch verification time) demonstrate the utility of our protocol in a real-world cellular network deployment.
Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the system and threat models for SMS security. Section 3 presents our proposed protocol. Section 4 presents the reliability analysis of the proposed protocol, a malicious request detection algorithm, and the impact on user mobility. The security analysis and the performance evaluation of the BVPSMS protocol are presented in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, section 7 concludes this work.
SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
In this section, we present the system and threat models.
System Model
We introduce a scenario where the MS sends an SMS to multiple MSs simultaneously. Upon receiving the SMS, each MS sends its authentication request to the AS for identity verification of the sender MS. The system model allows many such concurrent executions (e.g., several MS sending SMS to multiple recipients MS. A scenario is shown in Figure 1 where multiple MSs send their authentication requests to the AS for the identity verification of sender MS at the same time. The AS handles the received authentication requests and authenticates all the MSs. The authentication request may be single or multiple. However, it would be uncommon to have only a single request at If the server can only handle one request at a time, then it requires a queue to manage all incoming requests. However, managing such a queue will result in increased overheads, time, and cost of authentication. In fact, the approach used for the authentication must be very efficient to handle all the requests in a very short time. To more efficiently handle multiple authentication requests, one solution is to perform a batch authentication for all incoming requests. However, there may be one or more malicious requests generated by the adversary. In such a case, we need to first identify the malicious requests and remove the identified malicious requests from the batch, then perform re-batch authentication. This comes at an additional cost to the rebatch authentication. However, the cost of authenticating each user is reduced. The notations used in the paper are presented in Table 1 .
Threat Model
We consider a threat model with three categories of mobile users, namely honest majority, semi-honest majority, and dishonest majority. In the honest majority scenario, the legitimate and honest MS and the AS behaves as per protocol specifications, while a few (no more than half the total) MS send incorrect outputs to the AS in a semi-honest MS scenario. However, in the dishonest MS (malicious MS to the network) scenario, majority of the MS (more than half) send fabricated information to the AS. Furthermore, malicious MS computes the required functions in a probabilistic polynomial time with auxiliary information. We do not consider these scenarios for the AS, as malicious AS does not have the correct keys in its database. Therefore, we consider only the trusted AS scenario where the AS always sends correct information to all the MSs. We also remark that an adversary can delay some or all the messages between the MS and the AS under a public channel.
In this paper, we consider two variations of the adversary models: non-adaptive and adaptive variations. In a non-adaptive or static variation of the model, a set of corrupted users are fixed, while in the adaptive variant, the adversary can choose any corrupted users in any numbers during run time. Furthermore, the adversary can choose any input for corrupted users. We also consider passive as well as active adversaries in the network.
i) Security and Privacy Attacks, and Integrity Violations: 4) Session Key Security, Forward Secrecy, and Nonlinkability: It is common practice not to send the session key over the network in a plaintext. The system must also defeat known key attacks and maintain forward secrecy. The protocol should be able to handle key generation, transmission, and its usage. The adversary must not be able to link current session information (messages and keys) with previous sessions, i.e., non-linkability. 5) Privacy Preservation and Untraceability: The original identity of each MS must be protected during its transmission over the network. Such privacy preservation helps to secure the system against MITM attacks and user untreaceability.
PROPOSED PROTOCOL: BVPSMS
In this section, we present the proposed efficient and secure batch verification-based protocol BVPSMS for end-toend SMS security over an insecure network. The BVPSMS protocol is illustrated in Figure 3 . The following subsections describe our protocol in detail.
System Assumptions
We make the following assumptions, similar to the traditional cellular network, for our system implementation: Assumption 1. An AS is deployed at the Authentication Center (AuC) similar to the traditional cellular network. Assumption 2. A Secret Key (SK) is stored in the AS's database at the AuC as well as on the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card of the MS during manufacturing. Assumption 3. The AS never discloses the stored secret keys to any other entity in the network. Also, it does not illegally reuse the secret key of any one mobile user to other users. Assumption 4. The process of generating Actcode and retrieval of SIMcode (discussed later in user registration subsection) is strictly kept secret and not publicly available. This is a realistic assumption as cellular network algorithms and functions are generally considered intellectual property.
Definition of the Functions Used
Our protocol uses different functions with standard notations, such as f 1 (), f 2 (), f 3 (), and E/D{}, similar to used by existing cellular network authentication protocols. In the protocol, f 1 () and f 3 () functions are two different HMAC functions to avoid any collision generated with the same input. We also consider AES with Counter mode (AES-CTR) to implement f 2 () and E/D{}. However, inputs for f 2 () and E/D{} are different. Modern mobile devices are fairly capable of computing these functions [9] . The structure of these functions as follows:
A one-way function, such as one-way hash function HMACSHA-256, which takes input message of 512 bits with SK key and generates 256 bits of hash code, out of which first 128 bits are used as the DK key. f 2 () Function: Any reversible symmetric encryption function, such as AES-CTR where the plaintext and shared key generate the ciphertext, and then ciphertext and the same key are able to produce the original plaintext. The key used in the function is DK, derived from the SK key at MS as well as at AS.
It is used to generate MAC codes, which can be implemented by a one-way MAC function, such as HMAC-SHA1 that takes as input a multiple of 512 bits message with DK key and generates 160 bits of hash code, where the first 64 bits are used as MAC.
E/D{} DK Function: It is used to encrypt and decrypt the transmitted messages over the network. AES-CTR with DK key is used for this purpose. The Modified AES (MAES) [9] with 256 bits of DK key can also be used as an alternative. However, a key expand function is required to generate 256 bits of DK key from 128 bits.
Detailed Description
Although the protocol is capable of supporting concurrent threads of different MSs sending their authentication requests with SMSs to several different MSs. For simplicity, in this section, we present a scenario where a MS sends multiple SMSs to different MSs. This scenario can be easily extended with multiple sender MSs. The physical security (any personal access by the end user/mobile operator/adversary) of the AS is assumed secure, similar to the existing traditional cellular networks. Hence, it is almost impossible to extract the secret key SK of a mobile user. Readers should not confuse the AuC with the SMSC. At the SMSC, mobile operator can easily access the content of each message. The AuC is secured against any personal access, and the keys stored at the AuC can only be accessed by the protocol during its execution. Therefore, the AS is secure against any personal access.
The proposed protocol uses a temporary identity (TID) for each user involved in the authentication process. The idea is to protect the user's original identity (international mobile subscriber identity IMSI, and not a mobile number) over an insecure network. A mobile user can be traced by its IMSI number. A mobile number is used just to connect with a user, but it is never sent or exchanged over the network. In other words, this mapping to recognize the actual user takes place only with the IMSI number. Relevant authorities, such as safety and security department, can trace the original user with the help of the cellular providers, but an attacker or other legitimate users cannot trace a user over the network during communication.
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Generate TID1, DK1, S-Actcodei, ReqNo, T1, MAC11 (a) Phase-1: protocol execution for mutual authentication.
MS
MS i We describe our protocol in four different parts: user registration, pseudo-identity generation, protocol initialization, and protocol execution. The protocol maintains message integrity between each MS and the AS using MACs.
1) User Registration:
When a user requests for a new SIM, the operator activates SIM card by establishing a connection between the SIM card and the AS. The AS generates a random SIMcode ∈ Z * p (where p is a large prime), stores SIMcode in its database as a label to the secret key SK, and also sends SIMcode to the SIM card during first use (e.g., when the card is activated). On receiving SIMcode, the SIM card stores it in the memory. The Actcode is a one-time activation code sent to the AS instead of the actual SIMcode, when requesting for the authentication. The purpose of this code is to help the AS to verify SIMcode and retrieve SK key from its database that belongs to a user requesting for the authentication. The AS sends a random new-SIMcode to all involved MSs for subsequent authentication request.
In the proposed protocol, when a mobile user activates this module to send an SMS to multiple users, an automatic signal is sent to the respective AS, which sends a random k to the user's device encrypted by its DK key. The user decrypts k and chooses n by its own. The selection of n is based on the average number of SMSs dropped by the network per unit time. Although there is no guarantee that an SMS will actually be delivered to the recipient, but delay or complete loss of a message is uncommon, typically affecting less than 5 percent of messages [58] . Hence, our scheme uses n ≤ 1.05 ×k. The generation and transmission of activation code S-Actcode by the sender MS and retrieval of actual SIMcode by the AS are motivated by Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme [59] as follows:
The goal is to divide the hash of secret SIMcode of the sender MS into n-pieces as {S-Actcode 1 , S-Actcode 2 , ..., SActcode i } (i = 1, 2, ...,n) such that: (i) knowledge of at least k pieces of S-Actcode i helps AS in the computation required to generate the final SIMcode, say SIMcode 1 's hash, and (ii) knowledge of any k-1 pieces of S-Actcode i cannot help in the reconstruction of the final SIMcode 1 's hash (considering all possible values are equally likely). Therefore, the sender MS sends S-Actcode i to n-recipients MS i . All n-MS i (in the ideal case) or at least k out of n-recipients MS i (in case of error or network failure) forward their Actcode i to the AS along with the received S-Actcode i (part of sender MS). The AS obtains the actual hashed SIMcode 1 after receiving at least k-S-Actcode i . The AS will then match the computed hashed SIMcode 1 with the stored pre-computed hash of SIMcode 1 of the sender MS. Once the hashed SIMcode 1 is known to the AS, it retrieves SK 1 key and derives a delegation key DK 1 of the sender MS. This entire process takes k points to define a polynomial of degree k-1 in a finite field F of size p where 0 < k ≤ n < p, SIMcode 1 < p, and p is a large prime.
The sender MS chooses at random k-1 positive integers
, where b 0 = SIMcode 1 . The sender MS generates n S-Actcode i points (x i , y i ) as (i, f (i) mod q) using the Lagrange basis polynomial, where q > n, q > b i . On receiving the message (from at least k-recipients MS i ), the AS reconstructs a polynomial by computing f (x) as:
Finally, the AS retrieves the actual SIMcode 1 (= b 0 ) from the computed f (x). In our protocol, each recipient MS i also generates its own Actcode i as follows:
At the MS i : Each MS i generates Actcode i = H(SIMcode i ) and is sent to the AS. We use first 64 bits of H() function as Actcode i , which is SHA256. At the AS: The AS pre-computes H(SIMcode i ) from the stored SIMcode i for each MS i , and then verifies Actcode i ? = H(SIMcode i ). Thereafter, the AS extracts SK i key and derives DK i key by referring SIMcode i of each MS i . The delegation keys are special keys that represent the corresponding users and are derived from the original keys. This idea prevents the original keys from been accessed by adversaries over the network. In short, the original keys cannot be derived and comprised by the unauthorized users.
We keep the selection of k points dynamic by the AS in each attempt to increase the difficulty of an adversary in correctly guessing the different pieces of the secret SIMcode 1 . Also, in each such request, n is randomly generated, which is at least 1.05 × k. For example, we can divide the hash of secret SIMcode 1 into twenty parts (n = 20) of S-Actcode i , and any fifteen parts (k = 15) can sufficiently reconstruct the original SIMcode 1 . Note that the construction of SIMcode 1 by an adversary is useless, as it cannot derive or extract meaningful information from SIMcode 1 and the information sent over the network. Later, in our protocol after verifying sender MS and all recipients MS i , the AS sends a new new-SIMcode 1 and new-SIMcode i to the MS and all MS i , respectively, for subsequent authentication request.
2) Pseudo-Identity Generation:
The generation of TID and retrieval of IMSI are not publicly available. We consider IMSI 128-bit as defined in the 3GPP specifications [60] , according to which the length of the compressed IMSI and encrypted IMSI shall be 64 bits (8 octets) and 128 bits (16 octets), respectively. We use an encryption function to generate a temporary identity of each participating user. Each MS i (including sender MS) computes TID i as TID i = f 2 (IMSI i , T i ) DKi to prevent the transmission of the original IMSI i over the network that protects IDtheft, eavesdropping, and MITM attacks. Here, T i is the current timestamp, DK i is a delegation key, and f 2 () is a reversible symmetric encryption function (e.g., AES-CTR).
The structure of this function may be known; however, DK i key remains secret.
Protocol Initialization:
Let m be the total number of authentication requests generated by various mobile users MS i (where i = 2, 3, ..., m+1) to the AS at the same time when they receive a request from the sender MS. Initially, each MS i (and sender MS) chooses a random number K i ∈ Z * p (where p is a large prime integer of 128 bits), generates current timestamp T i , and derives a delegation key DK i , where DK i = f 1 (T i ) SKi and f 1 () is a hashbased MAC function, such as HMACSHA-256. Thereafter, each MS i computes Y i = K i ⊕ IMSI i and a symmetricsignature Z i = (K i + DK i ⊕ ReqNo) mod m, where ⊕ is a bitwise XOR operation. Each mobile user generates a valid symmetric-signature and fulfills the security properties with Assumption 3, such as authenticity (the signer itself signs the associated message with its key), unforgeability (only the signer can generate a valid symmetric-signature for the associated message, assuming an honest AS), non-reusability (generated symmetric-signature cannot be reused), nonrepudiation (signer cannot deny the signing of a message, i.e., symmetric-signature, with a honest AS), and integrity (ensures that content has not been modified). Note that in symmetric key cryptography, both parties know the shared secret key. If they send messages to a third party, then it is difficult to determine the sender of the message received by a third party. In such a scenario, only two parties are involved. In other words, only the MS i (and sender MS) and the AS know the corresponding SK i key as well as the generated DK i key.
Protocol Execution:
This phase proceeds the execution of the proposed protocol in two parts: a fresh batch authentication and the subsequent authentications. A batch authentication process verifies the identites of the sender and all receiver MS simultaneously. If a batch process contains malicious MS and does not successfully verifies the identities of all users, a re-batch authentication will be performed after detecting the malicious users in the batch. Once a batch authentication is successful, the verified sender and receiver users can directly communicate with each other using a delegation key with a specified expiry time.
Phase-1: Batch Authentication:
The proposed protocol performs the following six steps for a batch authentication:
The sender MS sends its request as {timestamp T 1 , ReqNo, temporary identity TID 1 , activation code S-Actcode i , MAC1 1 }, where
On receiving the request, all recipients MS i compute MAC1 1 and verify MAC1 1 ? = MAC1 1 . If it verifies, then the respective MS i proceeds; otherwise, the connection is terminated by the MS i . The MS i who successfully verify MAC1 1 , compute and send their activation codes Actcode i , temporary identity TID i , timestamps T i , variables Y i and Z i , and MAC2 i to the AS along with message-1 received from the MS except MAC1 1 (message-2), where
Step 3. [AS → MS: E{T m+1 , ExpT} DK1 ]: On receiving the message, the AS computes MAC2 i for all the received messages from different MS i and compares MAC2 i ? = MAC2 i . If the verification returns false, the AS terminates the connection for the MS i . Otherwise, the AS extracts the hashed SIMcode i and computes DK i key (from the respective Actcode i and SK i ) and IMSI i = f 2 (TID i , T i ) DKi (from the received TID i ) for all valid MS i . The AS also computes the hashed SIMcode 1 , extracts SK 1 key, derives DK 1 key and retrieves IMSI 1 . Thereafter, the AS computes
= R) is true at the AS, all MS i are successfully verified by the AS. Otherwise, one or more MS i are malicious, which requires a re-batch authentication.
Re-batch Authentication Process:
In a re-batch authentication, the AS finds all invalid MS i using a detection algorithm "Malicious Requests Detection" (discussed in Section 4) and removes all invalid MS i from the batch. After removing malicious MS i from a 
If the verification returns true, the AS is verified by all MS i . Otherwise, the particular MS i terminates the connection. 
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the reliability of the BVPSMS protocol, an algorithm to detect malicious requests, and the impact of user mobility [14] , [48] . Proposition 1. Hypergeometric distribution probability helps to predict malicious requests in a batch and determines the reliability of the proposed protocol.
If we can determine the approximate number of malicious user requests involved in the process, Hypergeometric distribution probability can help us determining the probability in detecting malicious requests in our system. Deploying an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), such as the one presented in [61] in the cellular network, can identify the suspicious malicious users. Let N M S be the maximum number of authentication requests generated by mobile users at any point of time. Realistically, some of these requests may be malicious, denoted as N IN . Also, we assume that N AS is the maximum capacity of the AS to authenticate requests at any point of time. For the statistical analysis, we assume that N MS = 100, N AS = 50, and N IN = 10% of the N MS , i.e., 10. Let Prob{t} is the probability when t malicious authentication requests are sent to the AS. The probability of Hypergeometric distribution [62] is as follows:
NIN t NMS NAS
, where t = 1, 2, ..., 10.
This indicates that (N AS − t) valid requests are sent out of (N MS − N IN ). Figure 4 shows the probability of Hypergeometric distribution when N MS = 100, N AS = 50, N IN = 10, and malicious requests are t = 1, 2, 3, ..., 10. This probability is maximum (0.25) for t = 5 (half of t), and minimum (0.00059) for t = 10 (last of t values).
Proposition 2.
There exists an algorithm that detects malicious requests in a batch.
In practice, few of the mobile participants may be dishonest or malicious. A dishonest mobile participant will always lie about the true secret value. Our scheme assumes that all shares lie on a single polynomial of degree at most k-1. This might not hold if the sender mobile user is dishonest
Algorithm 1 Malicious Requests Detection
Input: The AS receives a set (AR) of m-authentication requests (R i ) as AR = {R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , ..., R m } at any time. Output: Returns a set of malicious requests (MR), otherwise returns True. or malicious and sends bad shares to some of the mobile recipients. However, our system model has a honest sender mobile user. But a mobile user participant who lies about his share can cause reconstructing incorrect value of the secret (hash of SIMcode) at the server. Our scheme is a fault-tolerant scheme that allows the hash of SIMcode to be correctly reconstructed, even in the presence of a certain number of corrupted shares.
We propose an algorithm to detect malicious requests of the MS i in a batch in at most log m verification rounds (O(log m)). The proposed algorithm, based on binary search approach, is explained as Algorithm 1. Only the hash-based search complexity is better than binary search. The hashbased searching is useful when you know the data, and even more efficient when the data is in sorted order (O(1)). However, in our protocol, the AS neither knows the actual data nor stores any data until it is verified. In such case, the proposed algorithm for malicious detection is suitable. Note that "batch verification (AR, m)" is the batch verification process at the AS involving P , R, and Y i as explained in our protocol. Each invalid MS i is placed on a black-list and can only be removed once the predefined time is over. During this period, the request from particular MS i is discarded.
More generally, if there can be t malicious users with faked shares (S-Actcode i , i = 1, 2, ..., t), we can show that the secret can be recovered and the malicious users identified if k + 2t shares are available for reconstruction. In other words, we need at least k + t honest shares available (in addition to the t possible malicious users) in order to recover the secret (hash of SIMcode) and identify the malicious users. We assume that there are t cheaters or malicious users participating at any time, where t ≤ k/2. In any secret sharing cheater or malicious identification scheme, the optimal cheating threshold is k = 2t + 1. In [63] , it is shown that in any such scheme, the following lower bound must be satisfied: |V | ≥ (|S − Actcode| − 1)/ + 1, where |V | exactly matches the above bound is said to be optimal. Let k = 2t + 1, p = 1/ and |S − Actcode| = p i , where i > 1 and S−Actcode = (S−Actcode 1 , S−Actcode 2 , ..., S−Actcode i ) is a shared secret. We can identify up to t malicious users such that |V | = |S − Actcode|/ 3n [64] . Now, we assume that j (n ≥ j ≥ t) number of participants are involved in a secret reconstruction out of n. Then, we have j −t legitimate shares in a secret reconstruction. When j − t > t (j ≥ t + 1), there are j−t t cases that will construct the legitimate secret [65] . This attack of not being able to reconstruct the secret succeeds only when j − t < t.
Proposition 3.
There is a sustainable impact of mobility when a user moves out of range of the home AS.
One of the challenges of the cellular networks is to provide a reliable and secure service to a mobile user when he/she moves to a roaming area. The proposed protocol works only if the AS receives at least k messages from the participated users. It is also assumed that the ASs are deployed at different geographic locations similar to traditional cellular networks, and are interconnected to each other with a pre-shared secret key between each pair of the ASs. When a roaming mobile user requests for an SMS service, the corresponding AS of that area handles the request, and sends the request message encrypted with pre-shared key to the home AS of the user. The protocol execution takes place at the home AS and the result is returned securely to the roaming AS securely. Finally, the roaming AS grants/revokes SMS service to the respective mobile user. Also, if one or more MSs are out of network, the AS will verify whether it has received at least k messages from different MSs. If it holds, the AS proceeds, otherwise the AS waits for a timeout period. If the AS still does not receive k messages, it discards the connections, and notifies the sender MS to restart its request.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section describes provable security of the proposed protocol by achieves the security goals outlined in Section 2.2 along with a formal verification of the proposed protocol. Provable security aims to give an guarantee that the proposed protocol is secure under a system model (described in Section 2.1) and cannot be broken by a class of adversaries under a threat model (described in Section 2.2).
The proposed protocol will not affect network and service control compliances with the relevant regulation in different countries with respect to spam and marketing. A sender can only send an SMS to a receiver if the receiver already agreed to participate and the identities of both users are verified by the authentication server. In most of these services, the recipient knows the actual mobile number (individual or service number) of the sender. The proposed protocol hides the actual identity of each user over the network. Hence, it is unlikely that spam messages could be sent using this protocol. This section further analyses different security properties fulfilled by the proposed protocol. A unique DK i key is used within the expiry of a session for each authentication between the AS and each MS i . A is unable to generate DK 1 /DK i key as it does not know the SK i key and the key generation function f 1 (). Since each S-Actcode i /Actcode i is sent over the network only once, the protocol is secure even if A is able to capture SActcode i /Actcode i . Moreover, A cannot derive any relation among captured S-Actcode i /Actcode i , as SIMcode 1 /SIMcode i are randomly generated at the AS. Moreover, after each authentication, new-SIMcode 1 /new-SIMcode i are sent to each involved MS/MS i . If A modifies Actcode i in message-2, the computed MAC2 i will not match with the received MAC2 i at the AS. Hence, the MS i will terminate the connection. Property 3. User Privacy. Adversary A cannot trace the original identity of the MS/MS i . In fact, A is not able to identify the actual user, even if it captures the TID 1 /TID i of a mobile user.
If adversary A is able to retrieve the original identity (IMSI) of a user, it can perform an impersonation and session hijacking attacks [66] . Our protocol preserves identity anonymity and untraceability properties. The user's anonymity and untraceability guarantee that besides the user and the AS ∈{networks}, no one including the operator: (i) can retrieve the actual identity of the user, and (ii) is able to identify previous sessions involving that user.
Untraceability: Our protocol satisfies untraceability as A cannot distinguish whether two TIDs correspond to the same MS/MS i or two different MS/MS i .
In our protocol, privacy of each MS i (including MS) is ensured. Each TID i is computed from the original IMSI i as TID i = f 2 (IMSI i , T i ) DKi before a message is sent by each MS i over the network. We implement f 2 () using AES-CTR with DK i key since no practical full attack has revealed against on AES. As TID i is used by each MS i over the network, A is unable to trace the original identity of the user.
Indistinguishability under Anonymous Identity: Our protocol is indistinguishable under anonymous identity as no adversary A at time t can distinguish between two chosen identities TID 1 and TID 2 with a negligible advantage.
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A cannot distinguish and relate TID i and other messages with ID i , as each TID i is used only once over the network. For all subsequent requests, a different new-ReqNo i is used each time when the sender MS connects to the MS i . The MS i sends an encrypted new-ReqNo i to the MS that will be used for the next authentication within a session. Hence, untraceability and identity anonymity are ensured, as A cannot trace TID i , SIMcode i , and new-ReqNo to link with users, and also IMSI i would not be revealed to A and intermediate operators. The protocol achieves fairness and guarantees that "no MS i (malicious or legitimate) has an advantage" and maintains correctness under honest, semi-honest, and dishonest majority scenarios.
The MS i (including MS) and the AS generate fresh DK i keys with unique timestamps, TID i , Actcode i and K i . Therefore, A cannot retrieve the information based on linkability.
Forward Secrecy: Our protocol maintains forward secrecy as no A could obtain past keys and generate future keys.
The SK i and DK i keys are never sent over the network, and a new DK i key is used in each fresh session to encrypt IMSI i using AES-CTR. Even compromising current DK i will not allow A to obtain or generate past and future keys. Also, the past keys cannot be used for future sessions, as endpoints generate a fresh DK i key.
IND-CPA:
Our protocol is IND-CPA secure as no adversary A in time t can distinguish between two chosen messages msg 1 and msg 2 , and has no or negligible advantage. P r
Assuming that A has unlimited access to the encrypted data using a random oracle, the messages encrypted by the same key in our protocol generate different ciphertexts. Even encrypting the same plaintext with the same key generates different ciphertext, as at least one of the input parameters of the message is always different. The MS i generates TID i as f 2 (IMSI i , T i ) DKi , where T i changes for each fresh message. We use AES-CTR as f 2 () that encrypts successive values of a counter with AES, and regurgitates concatenation of the encrypted blocks. AES-CTR stream never includes twice the same block and is IND-CPA.
A protocol is said to be fair if it ensures that no user can gain a significant advantage over other users, even if the protocol halts for any reason. In our protocol, the MS/MS i and the AS learn each others' information. However, the MS and the MS i cannot learn any information about each other, as one user is unable to obtain DK i keys belonging to other users. Users are also unable to derive IMSI i /TID i of each others, as each DK i is secret. Also, A cannot generate a valid symmetric-signature S i , as it does not know the correct SK i and/or DK i keys, and K i is randomly generated by each MS i . Our protocol also maintains IND-CPA; therefore, no MS i has an advantage over others. The proposed protocol fairly works under all three scenarios. We consider these scenarios only for the MS i , not for the AS. The reason is that the AS keeps SK i keys of all MS i secret. Hence, it cannot be dishonest or semi-dishonest. The effectiveness of our protocol under all three scenarios can be observed by re-batch verification time discussed in Section 6.2.3. Our protocol maintains security properties under these scenarios, such as IND-CPA, forward secrecy and fairness. Property 5. Defeating Other Security Attacks. Our protocol defeats SMS disclosure, SMS spoofing, replay, MITM, and impersonation attacks between the MS/MS i and the AS. The protocol provides security protection over-the-air and SS7 channel. A cannot compromise message confidentiality and integrity. The protocol is secure against both passive and active corruption attacks in the presence of non-adaptive and/or adaptive adversaries.
BVPSMS provides mutual authentication between the AS and the MS/MS i by verifying (
= R, and P i ? = P i . It prevents the system against impersonation attack. Transmitted messages are securely encrypted using AES-CTR, which protects the system against SMS disclosure and MITM attacks. A is unable capture actual IMSI using IMSI catcher as each MS/MS i sends its TID over the network. It also prevents SMS spoofing as A cannot impersonate the server as a legitimate user because TID changes each time a user communicates. Furthermore, a timestamp value sent with each message protects the system against replay attack. Our protocol provides end-to-end SMS security from the MS to all MS i over OTA interface and SS7 channel, as each confidential message is encrypted using AES-CTR with a 128-bit key. Moreover, message integrity (message content and its threshold delivery in time) is maintained, as T receive ≤ T generate + T threshold and MACs are used for verification and the messages received after will be lapsed.
In passive and active corruption attacks, A obtains complete information held by the corrupted MS i (while a MS i still runs protocol correctly) and A takes over control of corrupted MS i , respectively. In both cases, our protocol maintains IND-CPA indistinguishability as well as perfect forward secrecy. Moreover, keys are never sent over the network, and delegation keys are generated only for a session. Furthermore, both passive and active adversaries can be non-adaptive (a set of corrupted MS i is chosen before the protocol starts) or adaptive (a corrupted MS i is selected at any time during protocol run). In any case, A acting as corrupted MS i does not affect the security of the protocol. Table 2 lists the security and privacy requirements achieved by the existing protocols. These protocols are secure against MITM attack, but do not provide integrity protection to the messages with the exception of RAISE [12] . However, RAISE [12] does not provide mutual authentication and is only partially secure against impersonation attacks. We observe that user privacy is preserved in ABAKA [14] and RAISE [12] , but both SPECS [17] and b-SPECS+ [15] suffer from replay attack. Our proposed protocol, on the other hand, fulfills all the mentioned requirements.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the performance evaluation of BVPSMS in terms of overheads, verification and re-batch verification times, and the time, space, and cost analysis.
Analysis
This subsection analyzes the performance of the BVPSMS protocol. We compare the communication overhead generated by RAISE [12] , ABAKA [14] , SPECS [17] , and b-SPECS+ [15] along with the BVPSMS protocol. There is no batch protocol for SMS security in the literature. However, we compare the communication overhead generated by the protocols with our protocol, as all protocols are based on authentication considering the same wireless network communication scenario, and also the flow of information is same in all the protocols. However, the computation overhead and verification delay are different in both types of the protocols because VANET protocols have additional devices and road side equipment to communicate information over the network.
Communication Overhead
Let m be the number of recipients MS i , and r be the number of subsequent multiple authentication requests within the expiry time, i.e., ExpT. The communication overhead can be defined as the total number of bits transmitted during the authentication process over the network. The transmission overhead generated by the BVPSMS protocol during mauthentication requests can be evaluated as: Phase-1: Total number of transmitted bits = (1)+ (2) BVPSMS is our original protocol that provides integrity to each message in two phases. Since all the protocols except RAISE [12] compared in Table 3 provide no integrity, we use two variants of BVPSMS for comparison: BVPSMS * for fresh authentication without integrity protection (as phase-1), and BVPSMS * * for each subsequent authentication within the expiry time of DK 1 key (as phase-2). For mauthentication requests, BVPSMS * generates 154×m bytes overhead, which is lowest among all the protocols discussed in the paper, while for all subsequent authentication requests, the overhead is only 34×r bytes. In the proposed protocol, the receiver MS will not be liable for any cost. Only the sender MS will pay the cost for sending the SMSs. Technically, there is no limitation of sending or receiving SMSs in the modern cellular infrastructure, assuming the upload and download data speeds are sufficiently fast. For example, 4G LTE offers typical download and upload speeds of 14Mbps and 8Mbps, respectively, whereas 4G LTE-Advanced provides typical real world download speeds of 42Mbps and upload speeds of 30Mbps [67] . At the time of this research, voice over LTE provides the fastest platform for sending an SMS [68] . The proposed protocol is efficient and practical as long as the authentication server is able to handle a batch process efficiently. The delivery of each SMS is handled by the SMS center, which keeps any undelivered SMS for 24 hours. Practically, it can handle a very large number of undelivered SMSs in the system.
Computation Overhead
The computation overhead generated by BVPSMS during m-authentication requests is shown in Table 4 . We consider all functions as a single unit cost. Then, the computations at the MS, MS i , and AS are as follows:
Phase-1: At MS = 8, MS i = 11×m, and AS = 6+14×m.
Phase-2:
At MS = 2×r and MS i = 2×r. Total computation overhead = 8 + (11×m) + (6+14×m) + (2×r) + (2×r) = 14+(25×m)+(4×r) bits.
We compute the communication and computation overheads (in bits) generated by our protocol when m = 10, 20, 50, 100; r = 1, 2, 5, 10. For m=100, the generated 
rT D{}DK , rT E{}DK communication overheads are 2745.875 bytes and 2970.875 bytes, respectively, when r=1 and r=10. Similarly, when m=100, the computation overheads for r=1 and r=10 are 314.75 bytes and 319.25 bytes, respectively. The computation overhead of the proposed protocol is much lower than the communication overhead, therefore, the proposed protocol achieves lightweight computations and can support a large number of mobile users to be authenticated in a batch. This also indicates that our protocol is efficient even when a large number of subsequent requests is executed.
Simulation
This section presents the simulation results of our protocol in terms of the total execution and verification times. We also perform time, space, and cost analysis of our protocol.
Protocol Execution Time
We implemented a client-server paradigm for our system, where the MS/MS i are the clients and the AS is a server. We performed various operations on an Intel Core i3-2330M 2.20GHz machine with Windows7 OS, 256 MB RAM, using JDK1.7 with J2ME WTK mobile emulator. On average, the execution time to perform addition, XOR, and subtraction are T add = 0.0009 milliseconds (ms), T xor = 0.03 ms, and T sub = 0.0009 ms, respectively. We setup the system with 50 MS i (and one MS) transmitting their messages to the server AS, when the MS sends an SMS to these MS i . The average value of 30 iterations is considered for each result.
Note that protocol execution time is the complete time for mutual authentication between all MS/MS i and the AS. Table 5 shows our simulation results obtained for various functions' computations. Here, Ext, TUM, Enc, and Dec are the execution time (ms), total used memory (bytes), encryption, and decryption process, respectively. The f 2 () is implemented as AES-CTR, where encryption (generation of TID i ) took 13.6 ms and decryption (generation of IMSI i ) is performed in 4.2 ms. The AES is a secure algorithm till date and CTR mode provide parallelism to speed up the execution. The same results are obtained for E{} DK1 /D{} DK1 using AES-CTR. The f 1 () and f 3 () are implemented as HMACSHA-256 and HMAC-SHA1, respectively. The output of HMAC-SHA1 and HMACSHA-256 are truncated to 64 and 128 bits, respectively because the output of f 3 () is 64 bits MAC, whereas the output of f 1 () is 128 bits, which is DK i key. The input to the HAMCSHA1 and HMACSHA-256 are 512 bits each (actual input size plus trailing zeros to make it multiple of 512). Also, the execution time of SIMcode using a random number generation and hash generation time of H() using SHA256 are 0.89 ms and 20 ms, respectively. 
Verification Time
The verification delay in our protocol is evaluated between the MS/MS i and the AS. It is the time estimation between the sent messages and the received response or the protocol completion. 
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Re-batch Verification Time
If a batch authentication is not successful, it is expected to execute a re-batch authentication without including the malicious MS i . After detecting the malicious MS i , it is required to remove them from the batch and execute a re-batch authentication process. The delay in re-batch verification can be estimated as follows: Total delay in a re-batch verification = 0.000933×3(m−1−t) + 0.030322 + 0.000933 = 0.028456+0.002799×(m − t) ms.
Simulation Results
The execution time of the BVPSMS protocol is observed when m = 10, 20, 50, 100; r = 1, 2, 5, 10. For m=100, the protocol execution times are 133.75 sec. and 134.17 sec., respectively, when r=1 and r=10, which are actually on average, 1.32 sec. and 1.21 sec. per user, respectively. It is clear that on average, the execution time per mobile user decreases when r increases. The execution time per mobile user also decreases when m increases and r is fixed. On average, the execution times of our protocol are 1.44, 1.38, 1.35, and 1.34 sec., respectively, when r=10 (fix) and m=10, 20, 50, and 100. The verification times for phase-1 and phase-2 of our protocol are also evaluated when m = 10, 20, 50, 100 and r = 1, 2, 5, 10, 50. For m=100, on average the verification time per user for batch authentication is 0.71 sec. Furthermore, for r=10 and r=50, the total verification times are 0.3 sec. and 1.6 sec., respectively, and on average, the verification time for each subsequent authentication per user is 0.03 sec. It is also clear that the increase in r lowers verification time, on average per mobile user. Rebatch verification time is also computed in our protocol when m = 10, 20, 50, 100 and malicious requests t = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. For m=10, the re-batch verification times are 0.044 ms, 0.03 ms, and 0.028 ms, respectively, when t=2, t=9, and t=10. Similarly, for m=100, the times are 0.22 ms, 0.21 ms, and 0.20 ms, respectively, when t=2, t=9, and t=10.
Time, Space, and Cost Analysis
In both single and batch authentications, two functions f 3 () and f 1 () are implemented as HMAC functions. The output of HMAC-SHA1 and HMACSHA-256 are 160 bits and 256 bits, respectively. The DK key requires 128 from 256 bits and a MAC needs 64 out of 160 bits. In total, 192 bits are required to be stored. Furthermore, the time complexity of add, subtract, and XOR operations are constant, i.e., O(1). The costs for a single authentication (8 operations) and a batch authentication (9×m − 1 operations) are also O(1). The time to compute Actcode/SIMcode is constant, and total cost is O(1). The block cipher algorithm, such as AES, works with a fixed input size and has O(1) constant complexity. However, when the algorithm has variable length of input (say |m|), the time is O(m). The block size is still fixed (128 bits) as the f 2 () and E/D{} DK1 are implemented using AES-CTR. Therefore, the time complexity is independent of input and is constant O(1). Hence, the costs are O(1) for f 2 () and E/D{} DK1 in a single authentication (2 operations) as well as batch authentication (2×m operations). The IMSI i and TID i of 128 bits each also need to be stored in the memory. Furthermore, the storage is also required for HMAC-SHA1, HMACSHA-256, and AES-CTR at the MS/MS i as well as at the AS. For a re-batch verification, O(1) is only the extra cost need to be paid (for 3×m-3×t+2 operations). Therefore, the BVPSMS protocol is an efficient, secure, and cost effective protocol that requires less storage.
CONCLUSION
We proposed a batch verification protocol BVPSMS for transmitting secure SMS from one MS to multiple MS recipients. This protocol enjoys several advantages over the related protocols studied in the paper. BVPSMS provides mutual authentication between each MS and the AS. The AS efficiently verifies multiple authentication requests sent by different MSs at any one time while keeping the original IMSI secret during the authentication. We then demonstrated that the protocol is secure against replay attacks, MITM attacks, impersonation attacks, SMS disclosure and SMS spoofing, and also maintains untraceability, forward secrecy, and identity anonymity. The performance results show that in different scenarios, i.e., BVPSMS * and BVPSMS * * when no provision of integrity protection, our protocol incurs a lower communication overhead compared to the protocols studied in this paper. Our evaluation of the protocol using Java demonstrated that the estimated rebatch verification time is almost negligible. The execution and verification times also suggested that our protocol is practical for deployment in real-world cellular networks.
sencrypt(newsimcodei,DKmsias) in let encDKms1as:bitstring = sencrypt(Dkms1as,DKmsias) in let mac3ias:mac = mac3f3(enctm2as,enctexpas,encnewrnoi, encnewsimcodei,pias) in event beginMSifull(AS, MSi, enctexpas); out(pubChannel,(MSG5,enctm2as,enctexpas,encnewrno, encnewsimcodei,encDKms1as,pias,mac3ias)); let encnewrno1:bitstring = sencrypt(newrno,DKms1as) in let enct1ms1:nonce = sencrypttime(tims1msi,DKms1as) in let encnewsimcode1:bitstring = sencrypt(newsimcode1,DKms1as) in event beginMSfull(AS, MS, enct1ms1); out(pubChannel, (MSG6,encnewrno1, (x 3230,y 3231) ) is true.
